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Notes
A Culture Without Consequences?
Redefining Purposeful Availment for
Wrongful Online Conduct
Jenny L. Grantz*
The Internet often seems like a place without consequences, where we can share our
thoughts without much consideration of whether the things we share might cause harm.
And even when Internet users knowingly cause harm to others, many escape civil suit
because they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s chosen forum.
Often this is a result of courts’ fear of creating nationwide jurisdiction in cases
involving the Internet, and often the reason given for denying specific jurisdiction is
that it was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that they might be haled into
court in the plaintiff’s chosen forum. But attempts to limit jurisdiction over wrongful
online conduct to those forums in which suit was “reasonably foreseeable” have
actually made it more difficult for defendants to know when and where they might be
held liable, as cases with the same facts can come to opposite results depending on the
test applied. This Note explores the current state of personal jurisdiction for intentional,
wrongful acts conducted over the Internet, ultimately concluding that courts must
create a better test for whether specific jurisdiction exists in these cases. Only when
courts focus on the defendant’s knowledge and intent with regard to the plaintiff can
they create fair outcomes in individual cases and ensure that Internet users understand
when and where they will be subject to suit.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012. I would like to
thank Professors David Levine and James Wagstaffe for their advice on this Note, Sara Tosdal for her
mentorship, Frances Valdez for her patience and enthusiasm, and the entire staff of the Hastings Law
Journal for their dedication and endless hard work. I am especially grateful to my family for their
constant support and faith, without which I would not be where I am today.
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Introduction
The Internet often seems like a place without consequences. Gossip
blogs and discussion forums purportedly shroud us in anonymity and
then invite us to share our every thought—or, at least, our funniest and
most biting comments—about other people. Google Image Search makes
it easy to find and download photos, logos, and artistic works regardless
of whether they are protected by trademark or copyright. And it is not
just unintentionally harmful conduct that gets a pass: Even those who use
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1

the Internet to knowingly harm others often escape punishment. Many
would-be defendants simply laugh off threats of defamation or
2
infringement lawsuits, assuming they will come to nothing. Often, this
assumption is correct. While some questionable conduct is protected by
parody, fair use, and other such defenses, many civil suits for wrongful
3
online conduct never reach consideration on the merits, as culpable
actors escape suit because of difficulties in establishing jurisdiction over
them.
Courts frequently conclude that they do not have specific personal
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants whose only contact with the
forum state is the wrongful act they directed at the plaintiff via the
4
Internet. This state of affairs is the result of courts’ fear that the
ubiquitous nature of the Internet will create nationwide jurisdiction over
all defendants in suits arising from online conduct. In assessing specific
jurisdiction in these cases, courts often focus on aspects of the
defendant’s online activity that do not relate to her knowledge or intent
5
with respect to the plaintiff. As a result, plaintiffs are unable to pursue
their claims on a theory of specific jurisdiction and instead must bring
their suit in a forum in which the court can establish general jurisdiction
6
over the defendant. This is true even if similar conduct would have
created specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a context other than the
Internet.
The struggle to define the scope of specific jurisdiction arising from
wrongful online conduct requires courts to balance competing ideas of
fairness: Is it fairer for a defendant to be haled into a forum in which they
might not have realized they had contacts, or is it fairer to prevent the
plaintiff from bringing suit anywhere except where general jurisdiction
can be established? In cases involving two private individuals, general
jurisdiction may be limited to the defendant’s home state, which could be
across the country from the plaintiff. As far as many plaintiffs are
concerned, then, fairness means that courts should have jurisdiction in

1. See Mattathias Schwartz, Malwebolence, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 2008, at A24 (discussing the
popular practice of “trolling,” or purposefully provoking others online for the sake of humor).
2. See, e.g., Rich Kyanka, Jones Soda vs. Something Awful, Something Awful (Oct. 17, 2008),
http://www.somethingawful.com/d/legal-threats/jones-soda-lawsuit.php (describing the parody website’s
response to a threatened trademark infringement suit).
3. In the context of this Note, “wrongful online conduct” refers to intentional conduct such as
tortious acts and to acts, such as infringement, that are treated like torts for the purposes of
determining whether the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See, e.g.,
Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs, Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the Ninth
Circuit’s personal jurisdiction analysis for cases involving tortious conduct in a copyright infringement
case because copyright infringement is “tort-like”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012).
4. The jurisdiction analysis discussed in this Note is used both by state courts and by federal
courts deciding state law claims.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.A.
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the broadest possible range of cases. Defendants, on the other hand,
would prefer to limit the court’s reach to those situations in which the
prospect of suit was reasonably foreseeable—and would prefer to define
“reasonably foreseeable” as narrowly as possible.
Courts tend to favor the latter position: The defendant’s ability to
reasonably foresee the possibility of suit in a specific forum is the most
7
touted value in cases involving online conduct. But this foundational
fairness factor has suffered in the struggle. Because cases with the same
facts have come to opposite results due to the application of conflicting
tests for jurisdiction, it is very difficult for defendants to predict when
and where they might be held liable.
8
A 2009 case from the District of Connecticut is illustrative. That
case concerned two Yale Law School students who were defamed by
pseudonymous participants posting to a law school admissions discussion
forum. The comments began in a thread entitled, “Stupid Bitch to
Attend Yale Law,” in which participants made sexually explicit,
9
derogatory comments about one of the two women. Similar threads
10
followed. When the website’s administrator refused to delete the
threads from the forum, the women filed suit against him and thirty-nine
of the participants, alleging publicity given to private life, false light,
11
libel, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. One participant
moved to dismiss the claims against him, arguing that his online
comments alone did not constitute minimum contacts with the forum
state of Connecticut because he did not anticipate that Connecticut
12
residents would view them. Nevertheless, the court held that it had
jurisdiction over him because he had directed his online activities at
Connecticut: “[A]t the time he wrote the messages he had ‘a pretty good
idea that some of [the other users of the website] actually were Yale law
13
students.’”
This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the one made by the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case that arose in the same year
from those same forum comments. While the first suit was pending, the
forum’s administrator sued the two women, their lawyers, and the public
relations agency the two women had hired to clean up their online
14
reputations by removing the offending posts. The administrator alleged
7. See infra Part II.
8. Doe I v. Ciolli, 611 F. Supp. 2d 216, 217–18 (D. Conn. 2009).
9. David Margolick, Slimed Online, Portfolio.com (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.portfolio.com/
news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying.
10. Id.
11. Doe I, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 217–18.
12. Id. at 221.
13. Id. at 223–24 (alteration in original).
14. Ciolli v. Iravani, 651 F. Supp. 2d 356, 360–61 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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libel, slander, and false light arising out of the original suit against him by
15
the women. In dismissing the claims against an employee of the public
relations agency, whom the plaintiff alleged had written and posted
defamatory articles about the plaintiff on the agency’s website, the court
found that the employee had done no more than “make information
available [on the website] to those who are interested,” and therefore
16
had not expressly aimed his conduct at Pennsylvania.
Thus, because the two courts applied conflicting tests, two very
different results arose from similar facts involving the same parties. It
seems unfair that the website administrator was haled into an out-ofstate forum as a defendant but could not rely on the same protections
when he was the one who suffered harm. This result also seems
inappropriate because the administrator was not directly responsible for
the defamatory statements at issue, but the public relations employee
was. Regardless of the relative culpability of these two defendants,
conflicting outcomes like these make it difficult for Internet users to
know when they might be held liable in a distant forum. As a result, users
are not on notice as to what conduct will subject them to foreign
jurisdiction.
This Note explores the causes of these conflicting outcomes and
argues that existing tests are not ideal. This Note is divided into four
parts. Part I discusses the underlying framework of specific jurisdiction in
cases arising from wrongful online conduct. Part II explains the
competing interpretations of existing tests for specific jurisdiction in
these cases and how these interpretations lead to contradictory outcomes.
Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s most recent statement on specific
jurisdiction and the effect that decision might have on cases involving the
Internet. Finally, Part IV explores options for a better test that focuses
on the defendant’s knowledge and intent, thereby making it clearer to
Internet users when and where they may be required to answer for their
actions.

I. The Traditional Boundaries of Personal Jurisdiction
on the Internet
17
Whether a state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident civil defendant depends on the nature and quality of the
18
defendant’s contacts with the forum. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from subjecting a defendant to
15. Id. at 361.
16. Id. at 369–70. However, the court did find that it had jurisdiction over the public relations
agency itself, based on the fact that the agency conducted business with the forum via its website. Id. at
366–67.
17. See supra note 4.
18. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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suit unless the defendant’s contacts with the state are sufficient “such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of
19
fair play and substantial justice.’” These contacts, in turn, may be
sufficient to support general jurisdiction, which allows state courts to
“resolve both matters that originate within the State and those based on
20
activities and events elsewhere,” or they may support only specific
jurisdiction, which allows state courts to resolve only those disputes that
21
“arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state.” A
state court has general personal jurisdiction over its citizens and those
who are domiciled in the state, including corporations whose activities
22
within the state are sufficiently systematic and continuous.
A state court has specific personal jurisdiction over defendants
located outside of the state and whose in-state activities do not rise to the
23
level required for general jurisdiction but do constitute the “minimum
24
contacts” required by due process. Minimum contacts exist where
(1) the defendant purposefully availed herself of the forum state, (2) the
plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the defendant’s forum-related activities,
and (3) exercising jurisdiction does not offend “traditional notions of fair
25
play and substantial justice.” This test, particularly the third prong, is
based on the notion that personal jurisdiction is proper only where a
defendant could reasonably foresee, on the basis of her relationships and
obligations in the forum, that she might be haled into court in that forum
26
in order to answer for her conduct. Courts frequently note that
jurisdiction is not reasonably foreseeable to a defendant whose contacts
27
with the forum state are merely “random” or “fortuitous.”
In many cases alleging intentional, wrongful actions conducted over
the Internet, plaintiffs must rely on specific jurisdiction because many
such cases involve defendants who are located outside of the forum state
and who are not otherwise subject to general jurisdiction there. In these
cases, the defendant’s only contacts with the forum state are the wrongful
conduct and, if the conduct involved a website, the relationship between
the forum and that website. But courts have difficulty applying the
minimum contacts analysis in cases arising from online conduct because

19. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
20. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion).
21. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
22. Id. at 317; see also J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
23. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
24. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
25. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–74 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 291–92; Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
26. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
27. See, e.g., id. at 295 (holding that an Oklahoma court could not exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident corporation whose only contact with Oklahoma was one “fortuitous” event).
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it is difficult to define purposeful availment in that context. Many early
decisions found purposeful availment based on nothing more than the
28
creation of a website that could be viewed in the forum state. However,
courts subsequently have realized that such a rule is too broad because it
29
creates jurisdiction anywhere in the world that a website can be viewed.
Such a rule, these courts reason, places too high a burden on those who
30
operate and maintain websites. As a result, courts have adopted two
more restrictive tests for jurisdiction resulting from online conduct: the
Zippo “sliding scale” test and the Calder “effects” test.
A. The ZIPPO Sliding Scale of Interactivity
The sliding scale test for purposeful availment was created in Zippo
Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. in 1997 by the District Court
31
for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Ever since then, courts across
32
the country have widely applied the Zippo test.
The Zippo court concluded that due process permits specific
personal jurisdiction in cases arising from online conduct based on a
sliding scale of the nature and quality of the activity the defendant
33
conducts over the Internet. Specifically, the scale focuses on the website
or other medium through which the defendant acted, rather than on the
defendant’s acts themselves. The court defined one end of the scale,
where jurisdiction is clearly proper, as “knowing and repeated”
34
transmission of files, and the other end, where jurisdiction clearly is not
35
proper, as simply posting information on a passive website. In the

28. E.g., Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (“Clearly,
CyberGold has obtained the website for the purpose of, and in anticipation that, internet users,
searching the internet for websites, will access CyberGold’s website and eventually sign up on
CyberGold’s mailing list. Although CyberGold characterizes its activity as merely maintaining a
‘passive website,’ its intent is to reach all internet users, regardless of geographic location.”); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) (“The Internet as well as toll-free
numbers are designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state. Advertisement
on the Internet can reach as many as 10,000 Internet users within Connecticut alone. Further, once
posted on the Internet, unlike television and radio advertising, the advertisement is available
continuously to any Internet user. ISI has therefore, purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
doing business within Connecticut.”).
29. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002).
30. Id.
31. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1123–24 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
32. A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to
Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 71, 80.
33. 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
34. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1265 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding specific
personal jurisdiction in a trademark dispute over a defendant whose sole contact with the forum state,
Ohio, was the systematic, continuous transmission of software files to users throughout the country via
the plaintiff’s Ohio-based Internet service).
35. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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36

middle are interactive websites that allow some input from users. In the
case of such websites, whether personal jurisdiction is proper depends on
37
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of that activity.
The facts of Zippo illustrate how the sliding scale may be applied.
There, a Pennsylvania plaintiff brought a trademark infringement suit
against a California defendant that did not have any offices, employees,
or agents in Pennsylvania, but that did advertise to Pennsylvania
38
residents via its website. It is not clear whether that advertising was
specifically targeted at or constructed for a Pennsylvania audience, or
39
whether the website was merely viewable by Pennsylvania residents.
Additionally, two percent of the defendant’s paying subscribers resided
in Pennsylvania, and it had contracts with two Pennsylvania Internet40
service providers to permit their subscribers to access its service.
Applying the sliding interactivity scale, the court determined that the
defendant had done more than simply operate a website viewable in
Pennsylvania or advertise in Pennsylvania via that website. By selling
user subscriptions to Pennsylvania residents and contracting with
Pennsylvania Internet-service providers, the court found that the
defendant had purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania law and could
41
therefore reasonably foresee being haled into court there. The court
reasoned that the defendant’s contacts with the state were not
“fortuitous” because the defendant had actively processed applications
from Pennsylvania subscribers and therefore knew that it would be
42
transmitting information into the state.
Determining where a specific case falls on the Zippo sliding scale is
far from an exact science. Courts disagree on the very meaning of
“passivity” and “interactivity.” Though the Zippo court defined passive
43
websites as those with which users cannot interact in any way, and
although most courts would place an online forum to which users can
post comments closer to the “interactive” side of the scale, in one case
the Eighth Circuit categorized such a forum as “merely passive” because
44
“users may actually only post information” on a forum. The content on
the website in that case was almost entirely user-driven: The website’s
only purpose was to serve as a repository for consumer complaints

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
Id.
Id. at 1124.
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010).
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45

posted by visitors to the site. By contrast, a federal district court in
California determined that a company’s website and Facebook page
(used to advertise the sale of its products in states including California)
together were sufficiently interactive to permit the exercise of specific
46
jurisdiction over the company in California. The content on the website
and the Facebook page was generated almost entirely by the company
47
rather than by visitors. These two cases are far from the only example of
the confusion surrounding the Zippo sliding scale’s categories.
B. CALDER, KEETON, and the Effects Test
Many courts addressing jurisdiction over wrongful acts conducted
on the Internet invoke the Supreme Court’s “effects test” from Calder v.
48
49
Jones and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. in order to determine
whether the defendant has purposefully availed herself of the forum
state, even though the effects test was not created explicitly to address
50
online conduct. This test is usually referred to as the “Calder effects
test” without mention of Keeton, though the facts of Keeton do affect
application of the test, as will be discussed in more detail later in this
51
Note.
The Calder plaintiff, an actress famous for her role in the Partridge
Family television show, sued the National Enquirer magazine, its
president, and one of its reporters for libel after the magazine published
an article claiming that she drank too heavily to fulfill her professional
52
obligations. The defendants argued that they did not have sufficient
minimum contacts with California to support the state’s exercise of
53
jurisdiction. The Court disagreed. The most important factor in this
conclusion was that although the magazine had a national circulation, its
54
largest circulation was in California. The other relevant contacts were
that the reporter who wrote the article lived in Florida but relied
primarily on information gathered through telephone calls to sources in
55
California, and that the same reporter had called California to read a

45. Id.
46. Wine Grp. LLC v. Levitation Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-1704-WBS-JFM, 2011 WL 4738335,
at * 6–7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2011).
47. Id.
48. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
49. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
50. In fact, the Supreme Court has never made a definitive statement on Internet jurisdiction.
Spencer, supra note 32, at 73.
51. See infra Part II.A.
52. 465 U.S. at 784, 788 n.9.
53. Id. at 790.
54. Id. at 785.
55. Id.
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draft of the article to the plaintiff’s husband. By contrast, the president
of the magazine did not have any contacts with California except for
57
having traveled there twice on vacation. He reviewed, edited, and
58
approved the article about the plaintiff while in Florida.
In arriving at the conclusion that these contacts satisfied due process
and supported the exercise of jurisdiction over all three defendants, the
Court noted the story’s particular contacts with California: It concerned
the California activities of a California resident, focused on her
59
California career, and was drawn from California sources. Most
important, the brunt of the harm resulting from the story’s claims was felt
in California—the harm being emotional distress and damage to the
60
plaintiff’s professional reputation. The Court did not credit the
reporter’s and the president’s argument that there should be no
jurisdiction over them because they were not directly responsible for
circulation or marketing in California (as they were mere employees
without control over these things) and because they had no direct
61
economic stake in the magazine’s sales in California. The Court instead
focused on the fact that the reporter’s and the president’s harmful
conduct was intentional, rather than negligent, and was “expressly
62
aimed” at California. They knew that their article would have a harmful
effect on the plaintiff and that the brunt of that harm she suffered would
63
be felt in California. Therefore, the Court found, all three defendants
64
could reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
The Court came to the same conclusion in Keeton, a companion
65
case decided the same day as Calder. In Keeton, the plaintiff sued
Hustler magazine for libelous statements published in five separate
66
issues. Hustler, an Ohio corporation whose primary place of business
was California, circulated 10,000 to 15,000 copies of its magazine in New
67
Hampshire each month. The Court concluded that the regular

56. Id. at 785–86.
57. Id. at 786.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 788–89.
60. Id. at 789–90 (“An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to seek redress from
persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly caused the injury in California.”).
61. Id. at 789.
62. Id. at 789–90.
63. Id. (“Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would
have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury
would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National
Enquirer has its largest circulation.”).
64. Id. at 790.
65. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984).
66. Id. at 772.
67. Id.
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circulation of magazines in New Hampshire permitted the state to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants when the libel action
68
was based on the magazine’s contents. Unlike in Calder, the bulk of the
harm in Keeton did not occur in the forum state, because the plaintiff was
not a resident of that state and herself had only minimal contacts with
69
New Hampshire. Nevertheless, the Court found that the magazine’s
circulation in New Hampshire was sufficient to constitute purposeful
availment because the magazine had “continuously and deliberately”
exploited the New Hampshire market and could reasonably anticipate
70
being haled into court as a result.
C. How the Two Tests Interact
Applying the Zippo test calls for a determination of whether the
defendant’s website was generally directed at the forum state through
advertising, engaging in business in the forum, or otherwise knowingly
71
interacting with residents of the forum. The effects test is applied quite
differently. Though the factors considered under Zippo may be relevant
to the effects test, the latter test considers additional factors. Each circuit
seems to have its own formulation of the effects test, but all of the tests
take roughly the same form, asking whether (1) the out-of-state defendant
committed an intentional act, (2) the act was expressly aimed at the
forum state, and (3) the defendant knew that the brunt of the injury
72
would be felt in the forum state.
Both the Zippo sliding scale and the Calder effects tests turn on
whether the defendant expressly aimed her conduct at the forum state.
Despite this overlap, or perhaps because of it, courts disagree on how the
two tests interact in determining whether the court may exercise specific
jurisdiction. Some courts start by identifying the type of conduct at issue
and then, if the cause of action is defamation or another intentional tort,
apply Calder, but substitute the Zippo analysis for Calder’s express

68. Id. at 773–74.
69. Id. at 772–73, 779.
70. Id. at 781.
71. See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002)
(“Thus, adopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a State may, consistent with due
process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State when that person (1) directs
electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other
interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person within the State, a potential
cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts. Under this standard, a person who simply places
information on the Internet does not subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the
electronic signal is transmitted and received.”); see also Spencer, supra note 32, at 80–82.
72. E.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693,
703 (7th Cir. 2010); Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1072 (10th Cir.
2008); Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir.
2006); IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d Cir. 1998).
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73

aiming prong. Other courts apply both Calder and Zippo independently
and then attempt to balance the results of both tests in coming to a
74
75
conclusion. Some courts apply only one test or the other. Additionally,
not all courts agree with the Zippo court that Internet jurisdiction
requires its own test. In fact, some courts have explicitly stated that
creating a separate test for Internet cases is inappropriate because
76
existing principles are sufficient. This confusion over the proper test is
only the beginning of the problem: Courts also disagree as to how to
apply the elements of each test.

II. Existing Tests: Conflicting Application and
Confusing Results
Courts addressing personal jurisdiction for intentional, wrongful
online conduct face three major questions. First, they struggle to define
the scope of the conduct that is relevant to determining whether the
defendant expressly aimed her actions at the forum state. Second, while
most courts will not exercise jurisdiction unless the defendant was aware
of the plaintiff’s geographical location, an increasing number of cases
have found jurisdiction where the defendant was unaware of the
plaintiff’s specific location but nevertheless knew that the brunt of the
harm caused by her actions would be felt in a particular place. Finally,
courts do not agree on how much harm must be felt in the forum state.
A. Should the Express Aiming Inquiry Consider Facts Beyond the
Defendant’s Wrongful Actions?
The scope of the express aiming inquiry is the most significant
source of controversy in analyzing personal jurisdiction for wrongful
online conduct. Courts disagree on whether and to what extent facts
beyond the defendant’s wrongful actions are relevant. The three most
common issues are (1) whether to consider the aim of the website or

73. E.g., ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714; Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009)
(citing Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir. 2002)).
74. E.g., Broadvoice, Inc. v. TP Innovations LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225–26 (D. Mass. 2010);
Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 343 F. Supp. 2d 868, 874–78 (D.N.D. 2004).
75. E.g., Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703 n.7 (applying Calder and declining to apply Zippo in a
defamation case); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying
Zippo and declining to apply Calder in a trademark infringement case).
76. E.g., Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 703 n.7 (“[W]e hesitate to fashion a special jurisdictional test for
Internet-based cases. Calder speaks directly to personal jurisdiction in intentional-tort cases; the
principles articulated there can be applied to cases involving tortious conduct committed over the
Internet.”); see Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has Misdirected
the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. Rev. 559, 584 (2009) (“The
Zippo sliding scale offers the most compelling example of why functional doctrine should not be
supplanted to address the societal changes brought forth through technology.”).
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other online medium through which the defendant acted; (2) the effect of
a website’s national, rather than state-specific, aim; and (3) whether
website users should be treated differently than website owners.
1. General vs. Specific Conduct
Most effects tests, as stated by various courts, seem to require only
that the tortious or wrongful conduct itself is expressly aimed at the
77
forum state, but in applying this requirement, courts often consider—
sometimes more carefully than any other factor—the forum-specific
contacts of the website or other online medium chosen by the
78
defendant. Similarly, the Zippo analysis is limited to the online medium
through which the defendant carries out her conduct and gives little
79
attention to the wrongful conduct itself. Though it might not be courts’
intent, focusing on acts beyond the wrongful conduct at issue strongly
favors defendants, because requiring express aiming of conduct besides
the wrongful conduct makes the location or amount of harm suffered
80
irrelevant or, at least, far less significant. As a result, even when all of a
plaintiff’s harm occurs in the forum state, she might be unable to
establish personal jurisdiction there, and because the effects test prevents
specific jurisdiction in a forum unless it is the location of the brunt of the
harm, such a plaintiff is left with only those forums in which the
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction.
Interestingly, then, even though Calder, Keeton, and Zippo all
resolved the jurisdiction issue in the plaintiffs’ favor, the application of
those cases to Internet cases increases the plaintiff’s burden. The
plaintiff’s burden is higher in part because, although Keeton is rarely
mentioned by courts applying the effects test to wrongful acts conducted
over the Internet, Keeton silently influences their application of Calder.
The Keeton reasoning depended almost entirely on the defendant
magazine’s circulation in the forum, as the harm felt in the forum was not
81
likely to be significant. But Calder depended at least as much on the
location of the brunt of the harm as it did on the defendants’ more
82
general targeting of the forum state. Courts that require more contact
with the forum state than merely the tortious act appear to be focusing

77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. E.g., Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 166 (2d Cir. 2005) (“No
single event or contact connecting defendant to the forum state need be demonstrated; rather, the
totality of all defendant’s contacts with the forum state must indicate that the exercise of jurisdiction
would be proper.” (quoting Cutco Indus., Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986)).
79. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
80. See Spencer, supra note 32, at 100.
81. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780–81 (1984).
82. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984).
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on the general circumstances, namely the extent of magazine circulation,
without which the Keeton facts would not have created jurisdiction.
For example, the Third Circuit requires that “[t]he defendant
expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum
83
can be said to be the focal point of the tortious activity.” However, in
Internet cases the Third Circuit often focuses on all of the defendant’s
contacts with the forum. Indeed, because that court has ruled that “the
mere allegation that the plaintiff feels the effect of the defendant’s
tortious conduct in the forum because the plaintiff is located there is
84
insufficient to satisfy Calder,” it is difficult, if not impossible, to find
specific jurisdiction without looking to contacts beyond the wrongful
conduct itself.
Plaintiffs bringing suit in district courts in the Third Circuit must
85
provide other evidence that the defendant targeted the forum state.
86
Marten v. Godwin is illustrative. There, the plaintiff took online courses
offered by the defendant school but was expelled from the program
87
because the school believed he had plagiarized multiple assignments.
The plaintiff sued the school in federal district court in Pennsylvania for
88
defamation based on the plagiarism accusation. The school’s sole
contacts with Pennsylvania were the emails the plaintiff received there
from the school, notifying him of the plagiarism allegations and the
89
expulsion. The Third Circuit held that the defendants’ knowledge that
the plaintiff resided in Pennsylvania and the sending of emails to him in
90
Pennsylvania were not sufficient to constitute express aiming.
The Marten court did not elaborate as to what behavior would have
constituted express aiming. However, it seems likely that nothing short of
establishing more or greater business relationships in the state would
have sufficed. Courts that require “something more” than mere
knowledge that harm would be felt in the forum state often focus on
whether the website advertised specifically to residents of the forum
state, the percentage of website users residing in the forum state, or other
91
indicators that the website itself was directed at the forum.

83. Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG,
155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d Cir. 1998)).
84. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998).
85. Id. at 265.
86. 499 F.3d 290.
87. Id. at 293–94.
88. Id. at 294.
89. Id. at 294, 298–99.
90. Id. at 298–99.
91. See Spencer, supra note 32, at 101–02.
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2. Nationally vs. Locally Focused Websites
Treatment of nationally focused websites and of plaintiffs with
national reputations is one of the most problematic aspects of the express
aiming inquiry. The question is whether the defendant could be aware
that her conduct would cause harm in the forum state, and many courts
find such awareness lacking when the website’s or the plaintiff’s
connection with that state is not obvious or when the site or plaintiff has
a connection with multiple states. This Subpart discusses the issue of
nationally focused websites, while Part II.B.1 discusses plaintiffs with
national reputations.
A website might be considered nationally targeted due to its
content, its advertising, or both. For example, many courts would hold
that a site hosting a forum discussing a nationally relevant, statenonspecific topic such as U.S. foreign policy is directed at a national
audience rather than at any specific state. Such a conclusion is especially
likely where all of the advertising on the site is nationally relevant, such
as for products commonly available across the country. Another
consideration is whether the website itself is advertised or marketed in a
state-specific way.
All of these factors affected the outcome in Gorman v. Jacobs,
where a federal district court in Pennsylvania determined that it did not
have jurisdiction over defendants who had posted on a nationally aimed
92
Internet forum. In that case, a podiatrist sued three other podiatrists for
comments they made on a podiatry news forum, PM News, in response
to an article in which the plaintiff had commented about the rising costs
93
of medical malpractice insurance. The defendants posted comments
about the article, contending that the plaintiff had served as an expert
witness for plaintiffs in frivolous lawsuits and that he had given false
94
testimony. The plaintiff sued for defamation, false light, and intentional
95
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court applied both
Calder and Zippo and noted that “how individuals use the web site is
equally, if not more, important than the features of the web site
itself. . . . [T]he defendant’s Internet activity—whether it be web site
operation or use—must evince an intent to interact with the forum to
96
justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” The court determined that
the PM News website was sufficiently interactive to make website users
amenable to personal jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction was not proper
97
because the website was not specifically aimed at Pennsylvania. The
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Id. at 543–45.
Id. at 544–45.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 546–48.
Id. at 549–51.
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website did not inform users that comments would be directed into any
specific state; therefore, using the website did not establish an intent to
98
interact with Pennsylvania—or, presumably, any other state.
The fact that the website’s intended audience was the national
podiatry community at large, rather than any specific state, was
especially harmful to the plaintiff’s case. Even though some of the
comments mentioned Pennsylvania, the court determined that these
“passing references” were made as part of arguments that actually
addressed national issues and therefore did not establish that the
99
comments were expressly aimed at Pennsylvania.
3. Website Owners vs. Users
The distinction between the website’s and the defendant’s express
aiming is especially problematic where the defendant is a user rather
than the owner or operator of the website or other online medium in
question. Courts contend that it does not matter whether the website
targets the plaintiff’s chosen forum if the defendant is unaware of the
website’s aim—and in many cases, that aim will be apparent only to the
website’s owner or operator. For instance, in Gorman, the court
concluded that even if the plaintiff could prove that a substantial
percentage of the website’s users were from Pennsylvania, that would not
create jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because information about users’
locations would be available only to the website’s owners but not to users
100
such as the defendants. Therefore, the court reasoned, the defendants
would not have been aware that their comments were aimed at
101
Pennsylvania.
But a website’s intended audience is much less relevant where the
defendant is a website user rather than an owner. That users are often
unaware of the location of a website’s audience does not mean that they
are unaware of their target’s location. Additionally, whether the website
is actually directed at a particular state might not be relevant to users.
The fact that websites are viewable anywhere in the country might lead
users to believe that their comments will reach their intended target.
Indeed, this assumption often appears to be the very motivation
behind defendants’ decisions to make defamatory statements on the
102
Internet. In cases such as Tamburo v. Dworkin, the defendants’
statements would have served little purpose if they could not reach the
plaintiff’s state of residence. In that case, the plaintiff took data, which he
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 549–50.
Id. at 550–51.
Id. at 550.
Id.
601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010).
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argued was in the public domain, from the defendants’ websites and used
103
it in his dog-breeding software. In a subsequent defamation lawsuit, he
alleged that the defendants “engaged in a concerted campaign of blast
emails and postings on their websites accusing him of stealing their data
104
and urging dog enthusiasts to boycott his products.” In finding that the
federal district court in Illinois had jurisdiction over the defendants, the
Seventh Circuit applied Calder—expressly declining to apply Zippo—
and found that the defendants had expressly aimed their conduct at
Illinois because they had purposefully targeted the plaintiff and his
business in Illinois with the intent of harming his business and reputation
105
there. It did not matter to the court that the defendants’ comments
106
were available more widely on the Internet. In fact, the opinion
concluded that the defendants intended to harm the plaintiff’s Illinois
107
business by communicating with a wider audience.
B. Must the Defendant Know Where the Plaintiff Was Located?
Even when the website in question is directed at a specific forum,
the express aiming prong and the knowledge portion of the brunt-of-theharm prong may not be satisfied. When the plaintiff has a national (or
multistate) reputation or business, it may be difficult for the defendant to
determine where the plaintiff resides or primarily does business and,
therefore, to know that her actions will cause harm in that particular
state. Alternatively, the defendant might be aware that the plaintiff
resides or does business in only one forum but, thanks to the anonymity
of the Internet, might be unable to determine which forum that is. Courts
have declined to exercise specific jurisdiction in both of these scenarios,
though some are willing to impute knowledge of the plaintiff’s location
to defendants in the latter scenario.
1. Plaintiffs with a National Reputation or Business
The national-reputation issue reared its head in Dring v. Sullivan,
where the plaintiff alleged that comments made on a Taekwondo
108
referees listserv were intended to harm his chances in an election to the

103. Id. at 698.
104. Id. at 697.
105. Id. at 697, 703 n.7.
106. Id. at 707.
107. The court likened their conduct to that in Dudnikov v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc.,
514 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2008), a case in which the Tenth Circuit found jurisdiction over a defendant
based on communications with eBay in California intended to halt an online auction created by sellers
located in Colorado. See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 706–07. Though the communications were directed first
at California, their ultimate aim was Colorado. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1075.
108. A listserv is like a forum or bulletin board, but is conducted through email rather than on a
website.
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109

Board of Governors for USA Taekwondo (“USAT”). The plaintiff
110
brought suit in Maryland, where he lived. It is not clear whether the
defendant had contacts with Maryland beyond his comments on the
listserv; the court noted that the defendant might have performed work
111
in Maryland as a Taekwondo referee but did not decide the issue.
Though the jurisdiction question was decided on state law rather than
federal due process grounds because the requirements of the Maryland
long-arm statute, which did not extend to the constitutional limits, were
not met, the court nevertheless found that the defendant’s contacts with
112
the forum would not have satisfied federal due process. The problem,
in the court’s view, was that the defendants’ comments on the listserv
focused on the plaintiff’s national and international activities as part of
113
USAT. There was no evidence that USAT had any connections with
114
Maryland other than having members there. Thus, jurisdiction in
115
Maryland based on the defendants’ forum comments was not proper.
The plaintiff’s national reputation was also a problem in Gorman.
There, one of the defendants contended that the plaintiff would “travel
anywhere” in the country to serve as an expert witness, indicating to the
court that it was the plaintiff’s national, not local, reputation that would
116
have been harmed.
2. Plaintiffs Whose Residence or Primary Place of Business is
Unclear
The defendant’s awareness of the plaintiff’s location can be
dispositive. In Tamburo, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that the
district court in Illinois did have jurisdiction over the defendants who
made defamatory statements about the plaintiff via email and on their
websites, but did not have jurisdiction over the owner of a listserv to
117
which some users had reposted the comments. The distinction was that
the listserv’s owner had no idea that the plaintiff lived in Illinois, while
the other defendants clearly did: At least one defendant posted the
118
plaintiff’s business address on his website.
In other cases where it is unclear that the defendant knows the
plaintiff’s geographic location, courts nevertheless find that jurisdiction
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

423 F. Supp. 2d 540, 542–43 (D. Md. 2006).
Id. at 542.
Id. at 546.
Id. at 547, 549.
Id. at 548.
Id.
Id. at 549.
Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 550 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 708 (7th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 706, 708.
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119

over the defendant is proper. These courts emphasize the difficulty in
pinpointing someone’s location when the parties’ only contacts occur
over the Internet and conclude that the defendant’s intent to harm a
specific person is more important than any intent to direct that harm at a
known location. In a sense, knowledge of the plaintiff’s location is
imputed to these defendants because they intend to cause harm to a
specific person and know that the resulting harm must therefore be felt
in a specific place.
In some cases, the knowledge requirement is loosened in a technical
but not necessarily substantive sense. One such case is Jones v. Dirty
World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, in which visitors to an online
forum made disparaging comments about the sexual history and
120
reputation of a Cincinnati Bengals cheerleader and schoolteacher. The
website’s owner personally responded to these postings and made some
121
negative comments of his own. The federal district court in Kentucky
denied the website owner’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s defamation
claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, stating:
The defendants publish invidious and salacious posts by visitors to the
web site, . . . they respond to those posts with their own comments, and
they thereby encourage and generate further posts by readers. In
effect, a dialogue is created. It is also a fair inference that the salacious
posts will invite hits from residents of the region where the subject of
122
the posts lives and/or works.

In essence, the court concluded that targeting of the forum state is
inevitable where the defendant directs “invidious and salacious”
comments at a citizen of that forum—a conclusion that echoes Keeton.
The court then found that the defendants “knew that the invidious
statements they posted would cause distress and harm to the plaintiff
where she lived and/or worked” because they knew the brunt of the
harm to the plaintiff and her career would be felt in the state in which
123
she lived. The defendants argued that it was not reasonably foreseeable
that the harm would be felt in Kentucky: They assumed that because the
plaintiff was a cheerleader for a Cincinnati sports team, she must have
124
lived in Ohio. The court discredited this argument because the Greater

119. E.g., Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(“Defendants allegedly purposefully transmitted millions of UBE to Verizon’s e-mail servers. They
cannot seek to escape answering for these actions by simply pleading ignorance as to where these
se[r]vers were physically located.”); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 834
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (“First Choice cannot plead lack of purposeful availment because the
‘nature’ of the Internet does not allow it to know the geographic location of its email recipients.”).
120. 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 830 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
121. Id. at 831.
122. Id. at 833.
123. Id. at 835.
124. Id. at 833.

Grantz_63-HLJ-1121 (Do Not Delete)

1154

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

4/19/20126:25 PM

[Vol. 63:1135

125

Cincinnati area included the Kentucky city in which the plaintiff lived.
Therefore, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the harm would be
felt in the Greater Cincinnati area, it was reasonably foreseeable that it
126
would be felt in the corresponding part of Kentucky.
Dirty World might not have loosened the knowledge requirement as
much as the court’s language implies. The defendants arguably did know
the specific location in which the plaintiff’s harm would be felt and
simply were incorrect about the geographic definition of that location.
However, other courts have definitively stated that even when the
defendant does not know in which geographic forum the plaintiff resides,
jurisdiction may still be exercised so long as the defendant’s conduct was
aimed at that forum. This was the case in Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU
127
LLC, where the plaintiffs sued the defendants in a federal district court
in California for fraud and unfair competition, among other causes of
128
action. The suit alleged that the defendants created a program designed
to falsify login information on Facebook, import profile and email
account information from registered Facebook users, and send
129
misleading emails using those email addresses. The defendants argued
that they were not subject to specific jurisdiction in California because
they were not aware that Facebook resided in California, believing
130
instead that the company operated out of Massachusetts. The court
disagreed and found that jurisdiction was proper:
The mere fact that the Internet provided [the defendants] a tool by
which they could carry out their conduct against Facebook without first
making efforts to learn its geographic location is not a reason to excuse
them from jurisdiction to which they would otherwise be subject. . . .
Here, there is no dispute that [the defendants] were fully aware that
Facebook existed, and that they specifically targeted their conduct
against Facebook. That they were able to do so while remaining
ignorant of Facebook’s precise location may render this case factually
distinct from prior precedents finding jurisdiction for acts of express
131
aiming, but not in a manner that warrants a different result.

The court did go on to note, however, that a defendant is not
necessarily subject to jurisdiction in any forum in which the plaintiff is
located merely because that defendant has used the Internet to “attack”

125. Id.
126. Id. at 834.
127. No. 507-CV-01389-RS, 2007 WL 2326090 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007).
128. Plaintiffs’ [Proposed] Second Amended Complaint for Violation of California Penal Code
§ 502(C), California and Massachusetts Common Law Misappropriation/Unfair Competition,
Violation of Massachusetts General Law 93a, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, and 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704 and 7705, at
¶¶ 46–75, Facebook, 2007 WL 4463731 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (No. 507-CV-01389-RS).
129. Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *5.
131. Facebook, 2007 WL 4463731, at *5–6.
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the plaintiff. Jurisdiction might not be proper where the plaintiff
actively concealed their location or claimed to be present in more than
one forum “based on a wide-flung network of servers,” or where the
defendant had no reason to believe that the plaintiff was located outside
133
the defendant’s forum.
Though courts are increasingly willing to impute some knowledge of
the plaintiff’s location to defendants in wrongful online conduct cases,
there is a limit to how far courts will go. The defendant must have some
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity, as illustrated by the
134
California Supreme Court’s opinion in Pavlovich v. Superior Court.
There, the plaintiff, a nonprofit trade association formed by the DVD
industry, was the sole licensee of a system used to encrypt copyrighted
135
material on DVDs. The defendant, a computer engineering student,
created a program that could be used to circumvent this encryption
136
system and freely distributed his program’s source code via a website.
The plaintiff contended that the defendant had sufficient knowledge to
foresee that his actions would cause harm in California. The argument
was twofold: First, it was foreseeable that the program would be used to
pirate copyrighted material, which would cause harm to the
137
entertainment industries centered in California. And second, it was
foreseeable that distribution of the source code would cause harm to any
licensees of the encryption system, which the defendant should have
known were located in California due to the prevalence of computer and
138
electronics companies there.
The court disagreed with both prongs of this argument. First, even if
the defendant did foresee that third parties might use his source code to
pirate copyrighted material and thereby harm copyright holders, this
awareness would not satisfy the express aiming requirement because the
139
defendant did nothing to encourage third parties to engage in piracy. In
other words, the court refused to hold the defendant liable for the
actions of third parties absent some sort of activity encouraging them to
take those actions. Second, and more important for purposes of this
Note, the defendant did not have sufficient knowledge of the licensee’s
presence in California because the prevalence of computer companies in
that state was not enough to overcome the fact that the defendant had no
140
information about the identify of any specific license holder.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at *6 n.4.
Id.
58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
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The key difference between Facebook and Pavlovich is that the
Facebook defendants knew exactly who their actions would harm: the
Facebook corporation. The Pavlovich defendant, on the other hand,
knew that his actions would cause harm to someone but had no idea who
specifically that would be.
Not all courts will find the defendant’s awareness of the plaintiff’s
identity but not location sufficient to satisfy the express aiming prong. In
fact, some courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction where the
141
defendant was aware of both the plaintiff’s identity and location.
Though courts generally may be relaxing the knowledge requirement,
this aspect of specific jurisdiction in cases involving wrongful online
conduct is far from settled.
C. How Much Harm Is Enough?
Courts applying the effects test agree that the defendant must be
aware that the brunt of the harm will be felt in the forum state. There is
less agreement as to how much harm is required to satisfy this prong.
Difficulty applying this prong stems from the conflicting facts of Calder
and Keeton. In Calder, it was clear that the plaintiff felt the brunt of the
harm in the forum state, while in Keeton the Supreme Court seemed
concerned with finding a forum for the plaintiff even though the brunt of
the harm was felt elsewhere. The problem in Keeton was that the plaintiff
could not turn to any other forum if jurisdiction could not be established
in New Hampshire: The statute of limitations barred her libel claim in
Ohio, where the magazine was published, and her invasion of privacy
claim in New York, where she resided and probably felt the brunt of her
142
injury. Thus, the Court noted, “It is undoubtedly true that the bulk of
the harm done to petitioner occurred outside New Hampshire. But that
will be true in almost every libel action brought somewhere other than
143
the plaintiff’s domicile.” The Court went on to say that libel claims
should not be limited to a plaintiff’s home forum and that the amount of
harm suffered by the plaintiff in New Hampshire was sufficient to satisfy
144
due process.
141. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796–97 (8th Cir. 2010) (“The Johnsons allege that
Heineman stated on www.ComplaintBoards.com that Sue Johnson and Cozy Kittens operated from
Unionville, Missouri . . . . Although we accept this allegation as true, alone, it fails to show that
Heineman uniquely or expressly aimed her statements at Missouri. The statements were aimed at the
Johnsons; the inclusion of ‘Missouri’ in the posting was incidental and not performed for the very
purpose of having their consequences felt in Missouri. There is no evidence that the www.Complaints
Board.com website specifically targets Missouri, or that the content of Heineman’s alleged postings
specifically targeted Missouri.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
142. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 n.1 (1984).
143. Id. at 780.
144. Id.
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Keeton thus stands for the notion that the “brunt” of the harm does
not mean the majority of the harm. The Ninth Circuit relied on Keeton in
Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme when it
concluded, “If a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of harm is suffered in
the forum state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been
145
In that case, Yahoo!, a Delaware
suffered in another state.”
corporation doing business principally in California, provided a variety of
Internet services to its users, including the ability to post items for
146
147
These services were provided in multiple countries.
auction.
Problems arose when some users created online auctions for Nazi
148
memorabilia, which it is illegal to sell in France. When a French
organization sued Yahoo! in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris,
that court issued an order requiring Yahoo! to “take all necessary
measures to dissuade and render impossible any access” to these auctions
149
in French territory. Yahoo! did not appeal but instead filed suit in
federal district court in California, seeking a declaratory judgment that
150
the French orders were not enforceable in the United States. The Ninth
Circuit held that jurisdiction over the French organization responsible
for the French suit was proper in California because Yahoo! had
151
experienced a jurisdictionally significant amount of harm there. The
court even stated that jurisdiction may be proper where the bulk of the
152
harm occurs outside of the forum. Here, the court likely believed that
Yahoo! felt the most harm in France because the French court’s orders
primarily concerned Yahoo!’s French websites, but nevertheless held
that a California court could exercise personal jurisdiction in the case.
153
In contrast, other courts do define “brunt” to mean “majority.”
Some decisions imply this requirement but do not directly state it. For
instance, although the Tamburo court stated in a footnote that it was not
addressing the question of how much harm must be felt in the forum
state, the outcome depended on the fact that “the whole of the injury was
suffered in Illinois, and the individual defendants knew that would be the
154
case.” Reading “brunt” as “majority of the harm” allows courts to

145. 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006).
146. Id. at 1201.
147. Id. at 1202.
148. Id.
149. Id. (emphasis removed).
150. Id. at 1204.
151. Id. at 1207.
152. Id.
153. Cf. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Moreover, Calder
requires that the ‘brunt’ of the harm be felt in the forum. . . . [Other] cases cast doubt on the assertion
that a company will feel the ‘brunt’ of a tort injury at its principal place of business when that injury is
based on damage to contracts or property not centered in the forum.”).
154. Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 706 n.9 (7th Cir. 2010).
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focus solely on the defendant’s actions and ignore the question of
whether the website itself was directed at the forum state. In this way, the
brunt-of-the-harm prong offers a solution to many of the problems that
arise where websites have a national reach or plaintiffs have a national
155
reputation.

III. The Impact of J. MCINTYRE MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO
In 2011, the Supreme Court handed down its first significant rulings
156
on personal jurisdiction in over twenty years. As both cases concerned
conduct that was at most negligent, and both focused on sale of goods
157
and the impact of the “stream of commerce” on personal jurisdiction,
neither is directly applicable to the type of wrongful conduct at issue in
158
this Note. However, one of the two, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
159
Nicastro, concerned specific jurisdiction, and as such the general policy
principles expressed by the Court in that case are relevant to this
discussion.
The issue in J. McIntyre was whether a British manufacturer of
industrial machinery could be required to defend a products liability suit
in New Jersey state court when one of its machines injured a New Jersey
160
resident. Six Justices believed that permitting the New Jersey court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over the manufacturer would violate due
process but were divided on the reasons why. Three Justices joined
161
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, while another joined Justice
162
Breyer’s concurrence.

155. See infra Part IV.B.
156. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion). The Court’s last significant ruling on
personal jurisdiction came in Asahi Metal Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
157. J. McIntyre was a products liability case, and thus would have concerned either negligence or
strict liability. 131 S. Ct. at 2785. Goodyear was a wrongful death suit predicated on allegations of
negligence. 131 S. Ct. at 2850.
158. Though the Zippo test is used by some courts in every case involving the Internet, regardless
of the cause of action, see, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th Cir. 1997),
the effects test is usually reserved for cases involving tortious or otherwise wrongful conduct. The
effects test and stream of commerce branches of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence are separate:
where one applies, the other does not. Cf. J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (“As a general rule, the
exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless the defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.’
There may be exceptions, say, for instance, in cases involving an intentional tort. But the general rule
is applicable in this products-liability case, and the so-called ‘stream-of-commerce’ doctrine cannot
displace it.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 2787 (distinguishing intentional tort cases from cases
governed by the general rules of purposeful availment).
159. 131 S. Ct. 2780.
160. Id. at 2786.
161. Id. at 2785.
162. Id. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion focused on the defendant’s actions, not
163
his intentions or what might have been foreseeable to him. In contrast
with the Court’s previous opinions on jurisdiction, the J. McIntyre
plurality minimized the relevance of foreseeability: “The defendant’s
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is
not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will
164
reach the forum State.” For Justice Kennedy, the fact J. McIntyre had
no contacts with New Jersey beyond the sale of one machine “reveal[ed]
165
an intent to serve the U.S. market,” not the New Jersey market. Thus,
New Jersey courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant because the defendant had never engaged in any activities
there “that reveal[ed] an intent to invoke or benefit from the protection
166
of its laws.”
Justice Breyer’s concurrence also centered on the defendant’s
actions and minimized foreseeability, albeit indirectly, but did not
require a showing that the defendant intended to submit to the forum
state’s jurisdiction. Instead, he focused on the defendant’s sales and
marketing efforts in the state, basing his conclusion that jurisdiction in
New Jersey was not proper on the fact that there was no “regular flow”
of sales by the defendant in the state, nor was there “something more”
167
beyond sales, such as state-specific advertising. Thus, it could not be
said that the defendant had made any “specific effort” to sell in New
168
Jersey. Of particular relevance to the discussion in this Note is Justice
Breyer’s concern that the plurality’s rules—that the defendant must
“inten[d] to submit to the power of the forum” and must “target the
forum”—might be too narrow to adequately address the range of sales
techniques made possible by the Internet: “[W]hat do those standards
mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web
site? . . . And what if the company markets its products through popup
advertisements that it knows will be viewed in a forum? Those issues
have serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in this
169
case.”
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg strongly criticized the idea that a
manufacturer may escape specific personal jurisdiction in any state by
targeting a national market for its products rather than a state-specific

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2788.
Id. at 2790.
Id. at 2791.
Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2793.
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170

market. She took particular issue with the plurality’s focus on what was
fair to the defendant rather than what might be fair to the plaintiff and
noted that requiring this particular defendant to appear in court in New
Jersey would be “a reasonable cost of transacting business
171
internationally.” She would have held that by engaging a subsidiary to
sell its products throughout the United States, the defendant had
purposefully availed itself of the U.S. market nationwide and “thereby
availed itself of the market of all States in which its products were sold by
172
its exclusive distributor.” After all, “[h]ow could McIntyre UK not
have intended, by its actions targeting a national market, to sell products
in the fourth largest destination for imports among all States of the
173
United States and the largest scrap metal market?”
The impact of J. McIntyre on the specific jurisdiction analysis is not
yet clear. For one thing, courts will differ over whether to apply Justice
174
Kennedy’s opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, or neither. And even
when courts decide which to follow, it is not at all obvious how to apply
the standards enunciated in either opinion. The pre-J. McIntyre status
175
quo likely will prevail in many courts, while others might believe the
case to be a radical departure from past precedent. Indeed, one court
applying Justice Breyer’s concurrence has already concluded that
“McIntyre clearly rejects foreseeability as the standard for personal
176
jurisdiction.” Despite this conclusion, the most J. McIntyre has made
clear so far is that “[s]ome regular and substantial number of sales needs
to occur in the forum” in order to support a finding of specific
177
jurisdiction based solely on sales.
Whether J. McIntyre will cause any court will change its analysis of
specific jurisdiction in cases involving wrongful online conduct remains
to be seen. Thus far, none have done so. The Ninth Circuit has explicitly
stated, and the Supreme Court has implied, that J. McIntyre does not

170. Id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2800–01.
172. Id. at 2801.
173. Id. (citing Ronan E. Degnan & Mary Kay Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and
Enforcement of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 Hastings L.J. 799, 813–815 (1988)).
174. See Megan M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear
Dunlap Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro, 15 J. Internet L. 3, 8 (2012) (explaining that some
courts will rely on earlier opinions because there was no majority opinion in J. McIntyre, some will
follow Justice Breyer’s concurrence based on the principle that the narrowest concurrence governs
where there is no majority, and some will follow Justice Kennedy’s opinion, believing it to be a
majority opinion).
175. Id.
176. Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., No. JKB-10-114, 2011 WL 5005199, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 20, 2011).
177. See Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the
Minimum Contacts Test, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 1245, 1265 (2011).
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178

apply to cases sounding in tort. But even if J. McIntyre is not applied
directly to Internet cases, the debate between Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg over the sufficiency of targeting a national, rather than state,
market has great significance. As has been discussed, the question of
national versus state targeting is often dispositive in cases involving
179
Courts that have already expressed a
wrongful online conduct.
preference for one argument or the other surely will cite to J. McIntyre
for support in future cases. And Justice Breyer’s focus on the plurality’s
potential impact on online commerce likely will attract the eye of courts
that are on the fence on the national-targeting issue or that have not yet
had the opportunity to address it.

IV. Creating a Better Test
Courts have attempted to prevent nationwide jurisdiction over
Internet users by narrowly defining express aiming and reasonable
foreseeability. However, the tests currently used to accomplish this
purpose have actually made it more difficult for defendants to determine
when and where they may be subject to suit. In order to ensure true
foreseeability and uniform treatment, courts should rethink their tests for
specific jurisdiction over online conduct.
Tests for specific jurisdiction in wrongful online conduct cases can
avoid the problems described in this Note by applying the following
principles: (1) the interactivity and aim of the website or other medium
through which the defendant harmed the plaintiff should not be
considered as a separate factor; (2) that the plaintiff might have a
national reputation or businesses does not automatically mean she has
suffered the same amount of harm in every potential forum; and (3) the
defendant need not know where the plaintiff is located in order to intend
to cause her harm in that location. The Facebook court’s succinct
explanation of this third principle is offered in Part II.B.2 of this Note,
but the first two principles will be explained further in this Part.
A. Website Aim and Interactivity Should Be Considered in the
Correct Context
First, courts should stop fixating on the aim and interactivity of
websites. This fixation leads to a number of problems: inadequate
consideration of the effort the defendant has expended to harm the
plaintiff, ignorance of the difference between website users and owners,
and overestimations of the level of effort required to overcome the
Internet’s lack of physical boundaries to target specific people and

178. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012).
179. See supra Part II.A.2.
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places. These problems will be alleviated—and perhaps solved entirely—
if the aim and interactivity of websites is no longer treated as a separate
factor in the specific jurisdiction analysis. The question should be
whether the defendant has expressly taken aim at the forum state, not
whether the medium through which the defendant acts has done so.
Thus, while interactivity and aim may be relevant to the express aiming
inquiry, they should be used as evidence of the defendant’s knowledge
and intent regarding the plaintiff rather than as a hurdle that must be
cleared before the defendant can even be considered to have such
knowledge or intent.
The first step is to do away with the Zippo sliding scale, which leads
180
to counterintuitive results in cases of intentional, wrongful conduct.
Instead of asking whether the site is interactive or not, courts should ask
how much effort the defendant put into using the site to harm the
plaintiff. For example, a defendant who posts a block of defamatory text
on her passive website arguably has worked harder to harm the plaintiff
than has the defendant who posts a defamatory comment on Facebook,
Twitter, an online forum, or any other, more interactive type of website.
The former defendant must register a domain name and construct an
entire website in order to share her statements; the latter defendant
merely writes a comment on an existing website to which she might have
181
no lasting connection and to which she might give little thought.
Likewise, courts should not make the website’s general audience
their primary focus, especially not when the defendant is a website user
rather than owner and thus has no control over the website’s reach.
Questions about a website’s general audience come from Calder and
Keeton, which are most easily analogized with websites delivering news
180. This Note is hardly the first to propose doing away with the Zippo test. The Zippo sliding
scale has faced harsh criticism from courts and commentators alike since it was first adopted. See, e.g.,
Howard v. Mo. Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 869 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (“We disagree with
the arbitrary ‘sliding scale’ approach adopted by Zippo . . . .”); Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V.,
113 F. Supp. 2d. 211, 222 (D.N.H. 2000); Borchers, supra note 177, at 479 (“At a technical level, there
are good reasons to doubt whether the Zippo framework really makes much sense.”); Dunham, supra
note 76, at 583; Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 Berkeley Tech L.J. 1345, 1377 (2001) (“The problems with the Zippo test are not
limited to inconsistent and often undesirable outcomes. The test also encourages a perverse behavior
that runs contrary to public policy related to the Internet and e-commerce.”); Spencer, supra note 32,
at 74 (“[T]he prevailing analysis embodied in contemporary Zippo-based approaches is fundamentally
unsound.”).
181. For example, consider the Westboro Baptist Church. Its website is entirely passive under the
Zippo sliding scale, but the comments that church members make on the website are intended to
inflame readers and have resulted in multiple defamation suits. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
1213–14 (2011); see also Borchers, supra note 177, at 480 (“To say that jurisdiction exists when the
publication is in the physical form and not over the Internet would be to attribute constitutional
significance to the difference between making the information appear in printed form versus on a
computer screen.”).
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of some kind or with services that are necessarily location dependent.
Courts analyzing the intended reach of a website do so because they
182
want to adequately address the defendant’s knowledge and intent, but
by focusing more attention on the website than on the wrongful conduct,
they actually accomplish the opposite. If the defendant has control over a
website’s reach and has attempted to limit that reach in some way, then
those efforts are relevant in determining the defendant’s intent. But
where the defendant is a website user, the website’s intended audience is
much less relevant. If the website does not indicate an audience, then the
court should look to other evidence to determine what the defendant
actually knew or thought about where her comments might reach.
Instead, by focusing on the website’s aim, courts impute the intent
of the website’s owners to all of the website’s users without taking into
account the users’ perceptions of the website’s audience or purpose. In
Gorman, for example, at least one of the defendants knew where the
183
plaintiff lived. When that defendant made defamatory comments about
the plaintiff’s business, he surely must have anticipated that any resulting
harm to the business would occur where the plaintiff lived. One wonders
if the defendant even thought about the website’s audience at all before
commenting. Like many Internet users, he might have assumed the
comments could and would be read anywhere in the United States.
Making information available throughout the country is a common
purpose of websites, especially those, such as the one used in Gorman,
that serve a nationwide organization.
B. Nationwide Jurisdiction Can Be Avoided in Most Cases but
Sometimes May Be Desirable
The second principle courts should keep in mind in these cases is
that the brunt-of-the-harm prong of the express aiming inquiry can limit
the number of potential forums, even for plaintiffs with national
reputations or businesses. The Marten plaintiff, for example, likely could
not have satisfied this prong outside of either his home state or the state
in which the school’s business operations were centered. The harm
suffered in that case related to the plaintiff’s ability to attend classes at
the defendant school, a harm that would not have been felt in the other
states with which the school might have had online contact because the
plaintiff had no connection to those states.
Even in cases like Gorman or Dring, where the statements at issue
concerned a national issue or reputation and therefore could have caused

182. See, e.g., IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 264 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that
focusing solely on the geographical location of harm fails to give sufficient weight to the defendant’s
knowledge and intent in causing that harm).
183. See Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 551 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
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harm to the plaintiffs in many states, nationwide jurisdiction need not be
the inevitable result. After all, the Calder plaintiff was famous across the
country due to her participation in the Partridge Family, but the
Supreme Court found that California was the primary location of her
injuries because the defamatory statements involved her ability to
perform her professional obligations, most of which originated in and
were carried out in California. Similar lines could be drawn in Gorman
and Dring based on the state in which each plaintiff did the bulk of his
business, created the relationships about which the statements at issue
were concerned, or carried out the majority of his relevant obligations.
On the other hand, nationwide jurisdiction may be acceptable in
some cases—and is in keeping with the Keeton Court’s rationale. In that
case, the plaintiff’s only contact with New Hampshire was the harm she
suffered when the magazine’s defamatory issues were circulated there.
Presumably, then, jurisdiction would have been proper in any and every
state in which the magazine circulated. Therefore, perhaps courts should
accept that jurisdiction in multiple (even many) forums is an acceptable
result in some cases.
Though Keeton and J. McIntyre may seem in conflict, a more careful
reading reveals that they are complementary. Justice Kennedy’s
comments about national versus state-specific targeting and about the
limits of foreseeability should be read together. Where one targets a
national market (or, as in some of the cases discussed in this Note, a
plaintiff with a national reputation), mere foreseeability about where
harm will be caused is not enough. This was true in Pavlovich, where the
defendant could only guess that distributing his source code would cause
harm in California. In such cases, as in J. McIntyre, limits on jurisdiction
make sense. “Reasonable foreseeability” does not mean conjecture. On
the other hand, in cases like Dring, defendants are certain (or should be)
that their actions will cause harm in a particular place. Their knowledge
and intent with regard to the plaintiff are the “something more” that
Justice Breyer was looking for in J. McIntyre. Indeed, Justice Breyer’s
pointed questions about online sellers like Amazon.com in his J.
184
McIntyre concurrence hint at continuing acceptance of widespread
jurisdiction over certain types of cases. And because the harm they cause
is more than foreseeable—it is certain—it should not offend the
principles underlying Justice Kennedy’s J. McIntyre opinion to exercise
jurisdiction over these defendants in any number of forums.
At least one court has concluded that express aiming may still be
defined broadly post-J. McIntyre. In Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand
Technologies, Inc., an Ohio-based corporation alleged that a Florida-

184. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2793 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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based corporation had committed copyright infringement by posting the
plaintiff’s copyrighted celebrity photographs on the defendant’s celebrity
185
gossip website. The Ninth Circuit held that California courts could
exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant even though the state
186
was neither party’s primary place of business. Though the website
targeted a national market and not specifically California, the court
found that the defendant had “continuously and deliberately exploited
187
the California market.” The defendant “operated a very popular
website with a specific focus on the California-centered celebrity and
entertainment industries” and, as a result, “anticipated, desired, and
achieved a substantial California viewer base,” which was “an integral
188
component of [its] business model and its profitability.” Thus, the court
concluded that “[a]s in Keeton, it does not violate due process to hold
[the defendant] answerable in a California court for the contents of a
website whose economic value turns, in significant measure, on its appeal
189
to Californians.” The court noted that if the defendant had been an
individual or an “unpaid blogger,” the result probably would have been
different because such a person cannot be as certain that their website
190
will be widely viewed. In other words, the national reach of the
defendant’s website favored, rather than opposed, a finding of specific
jurisdiction. This national reach was what ensured that the defendant’s
action would cause harm in a distant state. Finally, the court
acknowledged “the burden that our conclusion may impose on some
popular commercial websites. But we note that the alternative . . . would
substantially undermine the ‘interests . . . of the plaintiff in proceeding
191
with the cause in the plaintiff’s forum of choice.’”
Regardless of the extent to which they draw from J. McIntyre, courts
facing wrongful online conduct cases should focus on the defendant’s
specific knowledge and intent with regard to the plaintiff. Only by
focusing on the defendant’s subjective beliefs can the court adequately
determine her knowledge and intent with regard to where she expressly
aimed her actions. And only when courts focus on these factors can they
define purposeful availment in the Internet context in a way that allows
defendants to accurately predict when and where they will be subject to
suit.

185. 647 F.3d 1218, 1221–23 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1101 (2012). The Ninth Circuit
concluded that J. McIntyre was not directly applicable to the facts of Mavrix because the case involved
tortious conduct. Id. at 1228.
186. Id. at 1221.
187. Id. at 1230.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1231.
191. Id. (quoting Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
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Conclusion
Just as the Internet facilitates the spread of information, so too does
it enable users to direct hurtful statements and actions at others, even
when the target’s physical location is unknown or unclear. Courts have
struggled to redress the resulting harms without creating nationwide
jurisdiction over every person who uses a website. This struggle has led
to conflicting tests and results for determining where jurisdiction may
properly be exercised, making it more difficult for Internet users to
determine when and where they might be haled into court. Current
approaches to defining specific jurisdiction for wrongful online conduct
threaten to turn users’ perceptions that the Internet is a place without
consequences into a reality.
Reasonable foreseeability is a touchstone of personal jurisdiction. In
deciding what is reasonably foreseeable, courts must look at more than
just the facts of the case at hand. They must also recognize the effect of
precedent on shaping reasonable foreseeability, especially in an area as
confused as this one. Only by focusing on the defendant’s specific
knowledge and intent can courts avoid creating jurisdiction for contacts
that are random or fortuitous and ensure jurisdiction in cases where the
defendant knowingly intended to cause specific and serious harm to the
plaintiff. A website’s level of interactivity and intended audience are only
two factors to consider and should have only minimal weight in most
cases involving website users rather than owners. Furthermore, courts
should not allow users to hide behind ignorance (willful or otherwise) of
a plaintiff’s geographic location. Finally, courts should accept that some
online conduct will lead to jurisdiction in multiple forums and, in
accepting this outcome, consider the Supreme Court’s desire to find a
forum for the victims of intentional, wrongful conduct.

